Jeffrey family’s suggested recommendations: ‘Do we have to suffer more dead Jeffreys?’

Jeffrey family’s suggested recommendations: ‘Do we have to suffer more dead Jeffreys?’

(Read by Barry Swadron, legal counsel for Reodica family .(First portion omitted. Footnotes not included in the following text– Ed.)

Background of Jeffrey Reodica

Although Jeffrey Reodica is not here for the jury to assess, this inquest has heard a great deal about him from various witnesses.

Jeffrey Reodica was 17 years old1 and a student at Jean Vanier Catholic Secondary School.

Jeffrey respected authority.

At school, he was respectful to his teachers.

He was polite, co-operative and courteous to his teachers.

Outside of school, he participated in Youth for Christ.

All of the lawyers here, no matter whom they represent, are agreed that he had no criminal record.

He was not a member of a gang: he was not the type of person who would join a gang.

Jeffrey was not the fighting type. His friends had never seen him in a fight.

There was no evidence of street drug use. There was no evidence of alcohol use.

What was he like as a person?

He got along with everybody. He was always laughing and joking.

He was always calm, even when mad. A friend said that he had never seen him angry.

And last, and certainly not least, Jeffrey was right-handed.

When you take all of what I have stated into account, Jeffrey certainly does not fit the description painted of him by Detective Constable Belanger.

Jeffrey does not fit the description of a youth who knew that he was dealing with the police on May 21, 2004.

Certainly, he does not fit the picture painted by Lilliwati Samlal. I am asking the members of the jury to discount her evidence. She was so certain of her evidence, yet she was so wrong:

– her physical description of Jeffrey was wrong (reddish top, 1-inch hair, Hispanic);

– she claims never to have seen a photograph of Jeffrey in the media (how could she compare?);

– her description of him as angry doesn’t match with those who had known him for years;

– she saw a police officer coming out of the passenger side of a vehicle which, in fact, was owned by a neighbour and locked;

– she saw the shooter performing CPR on Jeffrey, but he stated that he did no such thing;

– she saw the shooter vomit, but no other witness saw any such thing. Even the shooter said it did not happen;

– she was obviously biased as she told the SIU investigator that her interview could be used so long as it helps the police officer

The death of Jeffrey Reodica, a young person who had so much to live for is a terrible tragedy. The fact that he was shot 3 times in the back by a police officer raises serious questions. Surely none of us wants such a horrible event to happen again. Unfortunately, the use of force expert called by the Coroner’s counsel is unable to offer any suggestions on how to prevent violent deaths of this nature. Please recall the last two questions that I posed to Mr. Weiler and the answers that he gave:

Q: Having examined the documents, are you able to offer any suggestions to the jury on how deaths of a similar nature could be prevented in the future?

A: No, I cannot

Q: From where you sit as a member of the faculty of the Ontario Police College, are you able to offer any suggestions about how recruits could be better trained there in order to improve how they handle situations such as the one under examination at this inquest?

A: No

The Reodica family refuses to accept those answers. The family urges the members of the jury to reject those answers. We must send a message to the police which will avoid deaths of other young people. I strongly submit that ways can be found to accomplish that purpose.

The Reodica family is genuinely trying to do everything possible to prevent other families from suffering as they have, as they are and as they always will. It is in that spirit that we will be suggesting recommendations that you might make in your verdict. Within the last couple of days, counsel were asked to exchange suggested recommendations. We did so. I am sad to say that after about 50 days of hearings, counsel for Belanger, counsel for Love, counsel for the SIU and even the Coroner’s counsel had no recommendations to put forward to you. The Reodica family is incredulous: Does this mean that we have to suffer more dead Jeffreys? Is that our lot? We urge you to suggest ways that will decrease the chances of more dead Jeffreys.

Perhaps this is a good place to mention a number of concerns we have with the report and testimony of Mr. Weiler. In the face of much contradictory evidence, Mr. Weiler comes to two critical conclusions. Firstly, he concludes that Belanger “correctly identified himself” to Jeffrey. Secondly, he determines that Jeffrey “elects to access a knife”.

With respect to Mr. Weiler, it is not for him to decide the facts: it is for the jury. He should have given his expert opinion based on the various scenarios: not just those which favoured Belanger. It is not that surprising that Mr. Weiler favoured the version of the police, bearing in mind his statement that he did not know why police officers would say anything other than the facts.

Teenage Bullying of a Racist Nature

The events of May 20, 2004 in the schoolyard clearly involved teenage bullying borne of racism. What other characterization can one give to the words “Fuck you Filipinos, go back to your country and eat your rice”? These racist acts led directly to the reprisal of the following day which ended in Jeffrey’s death. The evidence of PC Douglas Ord indicated that each police division has a community relations officer. We believe that the community relations officer is well-positioned to inform students about policing within a diverse community.

Suggested Recommendation:

* Community relations officers in the Toronto Police Service should, with the co-operation of the Toronto school boards, seek invitations to all schools in their division on an annual basis to acquaint students with diversity programs within the Toronto Police Service, and to establish a direct line of communication between young people and the police officers who serve their community.

Evidence was heard at the inquest that a teacher at St. Rose of Lima Catholic Public School witnessed the altercation between the white youths and the Filipino youths in the schoolyard the day before Jeffrey Reodica was shot. On the day of the shooting, that teacher described the altercation to her class as racially motivated. If that teacher had reported the event to the police immediately after she saw it, perhaps the appropriate police authorities could have investigated the incident and taken preventive measures.

Suggested Recommendation:

* Teachers and other community workers who are involved with youth should be encouraged to report incidents of youth racism involving physical violence to the Toronto Police Service.

Police Dispatch

Evidence heard at the inquest indicates that police dispatch operators have no input in respect of whether a marked police car is indicated in a particular case. If police dispatch operators were trained so that they would be knowledgeable of what types of calls should indicate marked cars, that aspect could be part of the dispatch.

Suggested Recommendation

* The Toronto Police Service should implement a system that would train and direct police dispatch operators to specify the need for a marked unit in the cases of certain types of calls.

In this case, no marked units were responding to the police dispatch in a timely manner. Ultimately, it was answered by Belanger and Love in their unmarked vehicle. The inquest did not canvass the availability of primary response units in neighbouring police divisions. Chances are that there might have been available (and perhaps even close geographically) a primary response unit in one of those divisions which could have accepted the call. A primary response unit, albeit from another division, may have produced a very different result in this case.
Suggested Recommendation

* The Toronto Police Service should explore the feasibility of permitting a system which would allow police operators to dispatch a call to neighbouring police divisions in the event that no marked unit is available in the division to respond to a call indicating the need for such a unit.

Uniformed Backup

Even though they did not go out on the road intending to accept radio calls, Belanger and Love accepted the hot shot call when there was no other unit accepting the call. Considering the nature of the call, that they were in plain clothes in an unmarked car, and that they did not know what they would be facing, it would have been wise at the outset to call for uniformed backup when it became available.
Suggested Recommendation

* Whenever an emergency call for service is accepted by plain clothes police officers travelling in an unmarked car, those officers should immediately request uniformed backup.

Pre-planning

Steven Summerville testified that neither Belanger nor Love noted that any pre-planning took place between then from the time they accepted the call to the time they arrived on the scene. Here they were, Belanger and Love, about to respond to a hot shot radio call which could well carry with it extremely dangerous consequences: a large group of males armed with knives and bats and the potential of a fight with no discernible plan.

Suggested Recommendation

* The Toronto Police Service should articulate a policy which would require escorting police officers who answer calls for service to communicate with each other from the moment a call is accepted until arrival on scene, planning strategies regarding access routes, deployment, potential backup, use of force options and other essential considerations.

Use of Force Equipment, Its Availability and Readiness

The Province of Ontario, through the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, has published a Police Standards Manual. According to section 1 of that Manual, every Chief of Police is required to issue to all police officers a handgun, pepper spray and a baton. In order to fulfil the purpose of this requirement, it follows that these use of force options must be ready and available for use by those police officers. Please note that the rule is not limited in application to uniformed officers. It stands to reason that any police officer, in uniform or not, who considers himself or herself available to answer calls for service should have with him or her all of those use of force options.
Suggested Recommendation

* The Toronto Police Service should require all plain clothes officers who may be called upon to answer calls for service to carry on their persons, or have available in their vehicles, all three of their use of force options: handgun, baton and pepper spray.

It follows that if these use of force options are not taken by the police officer when exiting the vehicle, they may no longer be considered options.

Suggested Recommendation

* The Toronto Police Service should require all plain clothes officers responding to calls for service to take with them all use of force options when exiting their vehicles.

Unmarked Cars

It is not evident from the testimony of Belanger and Love whether the unmarked car which they were operating (temporarily borrowed from their immediate superior) during the event was equipped with a light which is illuminated and signals the words “STOP POLICE”, commonly known as a “red cherry”. We believe that if the unmarked vehicle operated by Belanger and Love was equipped with a “red cherry” and it were deployed, that in itself would indicate to civilians that the occupants of the unmarked car were police officers.

There was some evidence that police officers choose not to deploy “red cherries” at times based on a belief that they are ineffective. In the event that improvements are required to the design, form and size of these devices to ensure that they are maximally effective, we are sure that that can be accomplished.

Suggested Recommendations

* All unmarked police cars should be equipped with a “red cherry” signalling the words “STOP POLICE”, to enable the occupants to broadcast the fact that they are police officers.

* The Toronto Police Service should revisit the design, form and size of “red cherry” signalling devices, to ensure maximum effectiveness and recognizability.

It was established in evidence that there is no indication on the exterior of a marked police cruiser that it is equipped with a siren. It follows that to equip an unmarked police vehicle with a siren would not compromise its undercover nature. The siren could be engaged sparingly, only if an emergency exists.
In this particular case, it is submitted that if the unit driven by Belanger was equipped with a siren and that siren was activated, it would have gone a long way to alert Jeffrey and his friends that its occupants were police officers.

Another device that was mentioned in evidence was a public address system,34 whereby plain clothes officers in an unmarked car could alert civilians that the occupants are police officers.

Still another police identification item was broached in testimony: a nylon windbreaker clearly marked with the word “POLICE” on the front and back. These could be folded so that they take up little room, placed in the glove compartment or under the seat, and deployed by the passenger officer.

Suggested Recommendations

* The Toronto Police Service should equip all unmarked police cars with sirens.

* Whenever an emergency call for service is accepted by plain clothes police officers travelling in an unmarked car, the siren should be activated.

* The Toronto Police Service should consider equipping unmarked cars with public address systems.

* The Toronto Police Service should consider equipping unmarked cars with nylon jackets clearly marked with the word “POLICE” on the front and back, which can be hidden out of sight.
Police Identification
The issue of police identification is central to this inquest. We have, to some extent, already discussed some aspects of police identification in our reference to unmarked cars.

Jeffrey’s family takes the position that Belanger did not identify himself to Jeffrey as a police officer. We have heard much evidence in this case about police identification: that Belanger and Love identified themselves as police officers to the people in the van; that Love told Mark that he was a police officer. We submit to you that the only question that you should consider is whether Belanger and/or Love identified themselves to Jeffrey.

The evidence is that Love did not identify himself at all to Jeffrey38 and he did not hear Belanger identify himself.39 Love was in the immediate area and Belanger was shouting his commands:40 surely Love would have heard it if Belanger identified himself. The only indication that Love had in that regard is his belief that Belanger was showing his badge.41 There is, however, much contradictory evidence on that point.

What should the jury believe? Some might say that certain witnesses were not in a good position to observe; that others might be biased one way or the other; and that still others are coloured by what they learned after the event. Tragically, we can no longer ask Jeffrey what he knew. What would really be reliable is evidence that was happening in “real time”. Actually, we do have such evidence: a combination of the transcript of Nabil Andrawos’s 9-1-1 call and the testimony of Mr. Andrawos and Adriel at this inquest. Mr. Andrawos called 9-1-1 to report the shooting down the street. He said that when he was calling 9-1-1, at one point he was outside and in front of his house and there was an Asian youth with shoulder-length hair beside him, who identified himself as a friend of the fallen youth. The Asian youth’s voice was heard on the 9-1-1 call, asking “who are those guys, man?” referring to the shooter and Love. The 9-1-1 call taker asked Mr. Andrawos if it was a police officer who was with the fallen youth. In turn, Mr. Andrawos asked the Asian youth: “Is that a cop?” The Asian youth answered “I don’t even know”. During his testimony, Adriel confirmed that it was his voice on Mr. Andrawos’s 9-1-1 call and that he was the Asian youth. Adriel testified that he was about 20 to 30 feet away from Jeffrey when Belanger first approached him. If Adriel did not know whether Belanger and Love were police officers, are we able fairly to impute that knowledge to Jeffrey?

If it were the case that Belanger and Love did not identify themselves as police officers to Jeffrey, it would not be acceptable police practice for them to use any force on him.

If Belanger did not properly identify himself as a police officer, then Jeffrey would have no reason to obey his commands. Further, in Jeffrey’s mind, without proper identification, Belanger’s conduct could be interpreted to be an attack by a stranger inviting a response.

Suggested Recommendation

* The Toronto Police Service should revisit its regulations relating to police identification in the light of the circumstances of this case, to determine whether there should be better and/or additional ways and means of identification for plain clothes, and particularly old clothes, police officers.

Love testified that when he went to reach for his badge wallet, the firearm in his holster was exposed to Mark. He assumed that Mark would know that he was a police officer because he was carrying a firearm. That assumption is, with respect, not justified in these times in Toronto. A number of witnesses testified that Belanger and Love were dressed as bikers. It is the case, unfortunately, that many criminals also carry guns.

Suggested Recommendation

* Plain clothes police officers should not assume that exposure of their firearm indicates to civilians that they are police officers.

Doubtless there are advantages of deploying certain categories of police officers in plain clothes and old clothes, depending upon the nature and purpose of the police activity involved. However, in this case, the need for “officer presence” was paramount. The intrinsic value of the message sent to civilians by uniformed police presence should not be underestimated. Whenever and wherever feasible, unless contraindicated, police officers should be uniformed.

Suggested Recommendation

* The Toronto Police Service should revisit the categories of police officers who are permitted to wear plain clothes and, only where it is essential for the effective discharge of police duties, should plain clothes be permissible.

Differential Treatment

When Belanger saw a youth pick up a baseball bat clearly for the purpose of using it as a weapon, he told him to put the bat away “because it is not going to help matters”. The youth complied. Within about a minute, more or less, Belanger saw Jeffrey holding a rock. He ordered Jeffrey to drop the rock. Jeffrey complied. Nonetheless, according to Belanger, he told Jeffrey he was under arrest for weapons dangerous.

Suggested Recommendation

* The Toronto Police Service should train their officers to be consistent in the exercise of their discretion to arrest, particularly when they are dealing with parallel circumstances within the same event.

Crisis Management

The initial crisis, as indicated in Darren’s 9-1-1 call, was that he was being chased by a number of people who were armed with bats and knives. That particular crisis was solved. Belanger and Love were able to confirm that Darren was safe when he ran into the van. Shortly thereafter, Belanger noticed Jeffrey carrying a large rock in his right hand. It is our submission that there was no officer safety issue at that point. According to the testimony of both Belanger and Love, neither felt intimidated or threatened by Jeffrey. Certainly, there was no issue of officer safety after Jeffrey dropped the rock. Any immediate danger had passed. In our submission, there was no fair reason for Belanger to arrest Jeffrey: there was no evidence of a fight; no one had been injured. Besides which, Belanger had just passed over the youth with the bat. With effective communication, Jeffrey could have been allowed to walk away. We leave to the jury the question of whether or not the shouting of commands by Belanger was effective communication. It is our submission that an otherwise calm situation was turned into a crisis which rapidly escalated, and with lethal consequences.
Suggested Recommendation

* The Toronto Police Service should re-evaluate the curriculum of its crisis management training in the light of the circumstances of this case, with a view to encouraging officers to do their utmost to de-escalate similar situations. Particular emphasis should be placed upon the events from the point when Belanger first confronted Jeffrey until the point at which Belanger stated that Jeffrey presented a knife, and the fact that Jeffrey was a young person.

Intermediate Weapons

Having decided that he was going to arrest Jeffrey, could Belanger have made use of intermediate weapons? By intermediate weapons, we mean an expandable baton and pepper spray. Obviously, he could not as he did not have them with him.

Both Steven Summerville and Aldo Altomare gave evidence that the baton could have been applied as a control weapon to weaken Jeffrey’s arm to the point where he would release it. Mr. Summerville testified, however, that the technique of utilizing a baton as a control weapon has been dropped from the training curricula of police officers. We fail to appreciate why the use of the baton as a control weapon is no longer part of police training curricula. Surely it would be preferable for Jeffrey to sustain a sore arm than to die.

It was the testimony of Mr. Summerville that pepper spray could also have been utilized to stop Jeffrey’s resistance.

Suggested Recommendation

* An expandable baton can be effective as a control weapon and its application in that manner should be restored to the use of force training curricula.

Coroners System

On a number of occasions, counsel sought to establish various distances between points based upon scales marked on exhibits. Counsel were told that this could not be done as the manner in which the exhibits were produced was such that the scales were unreliable. The opportunity to question eyewitnesses in a meaningful manner about their proximity to the events was compromised.
Suggested Recommendation

* All maps and charts produced for the benefit of the participants of a coroner’s inquest should be such that their scale measurements are reliable.

Early in the inquest, an audiotape of numerous 9-1-1 calls (Exhibit 2) was played. A transcript of those calls was filed as an exhibit (Exhibit 2A) and provided to counsel and also to members of the jury. Exhibit 2A did not contain the real time of the calls. When a number of 9-1-1 callers were called to testify at the inquest, the inquest did not have the benefit of knowing the precise times that the calls were made. Had counsel and the jurors known what times the calls had been placed, they would better have been able to appreciate the context and further questions could have been posed to the witnesses while they were testifying. (Eventually, the precise times of the 9-1-1 calls were provided in Exhibit 2B). That opportunity was, unfortunately, lost.

Suggested Recommendation

* The precise times of any 9-1-1 calls should be made available at the time they are introduced at a coroner’s inquest.

The “Knife”

There are many mysterious questions about the purported knife in Jeffrey’s hands. The family takes the position that, at the time he was shot, Jeffrey did not have a knife in his hand. Please remember the evidence:

• of the numerous eyewitnesses, only two – Belanger and Love – saw a knife in Jeffrey’s hand when he was shot;

• their evidence was that the knife was in Jeffrey’s left hand;

• Jeffrey was right-handed;

• Belanger’s own fingerprint expert testified that Exhibit 13 (the knife) is the type that could hold identifiable fingerprints;

• although there was evidence that Exhibit 13 (the knife) belonged to Jeffrey for months, it did not contain his fingerprints;

• Jeffrey pushed himself up (presumably with his hands) despite the pressures placed upon him by Belanger and Love;

• Belanger and Love weighed a combined 525 pounds;

• although Belanger testified that he thought he had been stabbed in his leg, he had no injury, there was no mark on his jeans, and there were no fibres on Exhibit 13 (the knife);

• although Love stated that he used his bare hand to remove the knife from Jeffrey’s hand, the knife did not have Love’s fingerprints on it;

• the only witness to Love’s removal of the knife was Love: no other witness saw that happen;

• none of the eyewitnesses to the shooting, except for Love, saw the knife lying on the ground;

• paramedic Paddison testified that he saw blood on the knife, but some two hours later, investigator Berney saw no blood on the knife;

• paramedic Paddison, who was wearing gloves, picked up the knife and may have moved it;

• Constable Clauson covered the knife with a plastic lid, which was not covering it some two hours later.
The lead forensic investigator in this case for the SIU testified that he is not involved in the use of DNA evidence. He stated that the knife which is Exhibit 13 was not tested for DNA matching. He said that the SIU does not conduct DNA testing and, if it were required, the knife would have been sent to the Centre for Forensic Sciences for the purpose. He knows of no discussions held at the SIU in that regard. In the end result, there is no scientific evidence that links Exhibit 13 (the knife) to Jeffrey.